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Background: Health care–associated infections (HAIs) are a major global public health concern. The lack
of surveillance systems in developing countries leads to an underestimation of the global burden of HAI.
We describe the process of developing a national HAI surveillance program and the magnitude of HAI
rates in Egypt.
Methods: The detailed process of implementation of a national HAI surveillance program is described.
A 3-phase surveillance approach was implemented in intensive care units (ICUs). This article focuses on
results from the phase 2 surveillance. Standard surveillance deﬁnitions were used, clinical samples were
processed by the hospital laboratories, and results were conﬁrmed by a reference laboratory.
Results: Ninety-one ICUs in 28 hospitals contributed to 474,544 patient days and 2,688 HAIs. Of these,
30% were bloodstream infections, 29% were surgical site infections, 26% were pneumonia, and 15% were
urinary tract infections. Ventilator-associated pneumonia had the highest incidence of device-
associated infections (4.3/1,000 ventilator days). The most common pathogens reported were Klebsiella
spp (28.7%) and Acinetobacter spp (13.7%). Of the Acinetobacter spp, 92.8% (157/169) were multidrug
resistant, whereas 42.5% (151/355) of the Klebsiella spp and 54% (47/87) of Escherichia coli were extended-
spectrum β-lactamase producers.
Conclusions: Implementation of a sustainable surveillance system in a resource-limited country was pos-
sible following a stepwise approach with continuous evaluation. Enhancing infection prevention and control
programs should be an infection control priority in Egypt.
© 2016 Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, Inc. Published by Elsevier
Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Health care–associated infections (HAIs) are the most frequent
adverse events threatening patient’s safety worldwide1 and cause
signiﬁcant morbidity and mortality. A growing proportion of HAIs
are related to antimicrobial resistant pathogens, such as methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus and multidrug-resistant gram-
negative bacilli.2-4
The global burden of HAIs is underestimated because data from
resource-limited countries are sparse. Very few countries of low and
middle income have national HAI surveillance programs,5 whichmay
be related to a lack of strong infection prevention and control (IPC)
programs in most developing countries, limited human resources
and expertise in the design and implementation of a surveillance
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program, or a lack of microbiology laboratory capacity at the hos-
pitals. In countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada,
England, and Germany, IPC programs have instituted HAI surveil-
lance as an essential element of health care.6-10 These developed
countries focus mainly on device-associated infection (DAI) sur-
veillance, allowing them to further analyze the impact of speciﬁc
risk factors and guide targeted interventions.11 In the developing
countries of the Eastern Mediterranean region, limited efforts have
been done to institutionalize national HAI surveillance programs.
Sentinel site surveillance in tertiary care hospitals in Egypt
showed high HAI rates.12-14 During the last decade, while IPC ac-
tivities were progressing in Egypt, it was deemed important to
implement a standardized national HAI surveillance program to
deﬁne the magnitude and scope of HAIs in the country and to allow
for interhospital comparisons of HAI rates. Therefore, a plan to im-
plement a nationwide HAI surveillance program in intensive care
units (ICUs) was developed with support from several partners: the
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC’s) Global
Disease Detection (GDD) Program in Egypt, the U.S. Naval Medical
Research Unit (NAMRU-3), and the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment in Egypt. The objectives of the national HAI surveillance
were to estimate the incidence of HAIs, obtain national bench-
marks, describe the microbiologic proﬁle of pathogens causing HAIs,
and inform prevention activities of HAIs. This report describes the
process of developing a national HAI surveillance program in Egypt,
including progress, challenges, future plans, and ﬁndings of the
interim (phase 2) surveillance.
METHODS
Baseline assessment of hospitals
An initial baseline assessment across 37 hospitals in Egypt was
conducted between October and December 2010 to assess labora-
tory and surveillance capacity. Trained personnel interviewed
hospital directors, infection control personnel, and senior physi-
cians and evaluated the microbiology laboratories. The baseline
assessment revealed that most hospitals had some sort of IPC
program; however, HAI case deﬁnitions varied widely across hos-
pitals. Although all hospitals hadmicrobiology laboratories, only 30%
performed pathogen identiﬁcation and susceptibility testing. The
baseline assessment provided useful information on the hospital
needs and informed the design of the surveillance approach.
Formation of a panel of experts
A panel of experts was composed of members from the CDC,
World Health Organization, U.S. universities, Ministry of Health and
Population in Egypt, and universities. The panel of experts was re-
sponsible for deﬁning the strategic approach for the surveillance
program, providing regular evaluation, and updating the surveil-
lance methodology over time.
Surveillance strategy and stepwise implementation of surveillance
The surveillance approach recommended by the panel of experts
was a 3-phase approach: phase 1) small-scale and pilot surveil-
lance to assess feasibility, deﬁne optimal methodology, including
case deﬁnitions, and inform phase 2; phase 2) expansion to addi-
tional hospitals to inform the design and conduct of full-scale
surveillance; and phase 3) full-scale surveillance. All surveillance
phases were active prospective surveillance and focused on ICU pa-
tients, a vulnerable patient population at increased risk of HAI
because of severity of illness, high exposure to invasive proce-
dures and devices, and high use of broad-spectrum antibiotics.15,16
Surveillance case deﬁnitions were derived from the CDC’s Nation-
al Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) HAI case deﬁnitions published
in 2008.17
Surveillance phases
For hospitals to participate in the surveillance, they had to meet
the following eligibility criteria: (1) presence of an IPC team with
at least 1 full-time employee, (2) capacity for data entry and trans-
fer, (3) functional laboratory with supplies and personnel able to
perform culture of all specimens and full bacterial identiﬁcation and
antimicrobial susceptibility testing, and (4) presence of ICUs and
IPC link nurses to monitor HAIs. Hospitals that were not ready for
surveillance implementation were supported by GDD-Egypt and
NAMRU-3 to enhance their capabilities to join the surveillance ac-
tivities at later stages.
Phase 1 surveillance (pilot)
The aim of this phase was to pilot the surveillance program in
ICUs at 11 hospitals. Phase 1 was conducted from April 2011-
March 2012. The 2008 NHSN case deﬁnitions were used.17 The
methods implemented and the results of phase 1 surveillance have
been previously published.18
Phase 2 surveillance
The results of phase 1 showed a predominance of 3 HAI types:
hospital-acquired pneumonia, primary bloodstream infections (BSI),
and urinary tract infections (UTI). The panel of experts suggested
limiting the surveillance activities to the 3 most prevalent HAI types
to reduce data collection burden and to allow for an expanded rollout
to other hospitals while ensuring collection of good quality data.
They also suggested adding surgical site infection (SSI) identiﬁed
in ICUs and excluding ICUs with an average length of patient stay
<3 days. Adaptation of the primary BSI case deﬁnition was done to
address the limitations identiﬁed in phase 1 and to increase the sen-
sitivity of the surveillance program as follows: (1) instituting the
clinical sepsis case deﬁnition for adult and neonates given blood
cultures were not routinely collected; (2) considering only 1 blood
culture for the diagnosis of BSI in patients with clinical signs of in-
fection (even if the organism is a possible contaminant) given that
collection of 2 blood culture bottles was very uncommon because
of the lack of resources; and (3) excluding the requirement of an-
tibiotic treatment as a component of the BSI case deﬁnition given
the widespread use of antibiotics at Egyptian hospitals. Finally, HAI
types were not restricted to DAIs given that 58% of BSIs were not
central line associated and a large proportion of pneumonias were
also not ventilator associated.18
Phase 1 surveillancewas conducted fromApril 2012-August 2014.
The 11 hospitals that started phase 1 surveillance transitioned into
phase 2, and an additional 17 hospitals joined the program for a
total 28 hospitals, 91 ICUs, and 989 ICU beds in phase 2 surveillance.
Phase 3 surveillance
Phase 3 surveillance started in September 2014, and as of Feb-
ruary 2016, the HAI surveillance program included 61 hospitals with
216 ICUs and 2,035 ICU beds. The surveillance methods remained
the same as phase 2, and the only changes implementedwere related
to improving the electronic reporting system of data, including im-
provements of the electronic algorithm for HAI type.
Surveillance deﬁnitions
For this surveillance, only ICU-onset infections were captured.
An ICU-onset infection was deﬁned as an infection occurring on or
after 3 calendar days after ICU admission or an SSI identiﬁed while
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the patient was in the ICU. Only ICU onset infections that met
primary BSI, UTI, pneumonia, or SSI deﬁnitions were analyzed.
SSI was deﬁned as an ICU patient with an infection at the surgery
site within 30 days after the operative procedure or within 90 days
if a device or foreign material was implanted. According to the level
of the infection, SSIs were classiﬁed as superﬁcial (only skin is in-
volved), deep (skin and soft tissues are involved), or organ space.19
Primary BSI was further classiﬁed as central line–associated blood-
stream infection (CLABSI) if a central line was present within ±2 days
of positive blood culture. A UTI was classiﬁed as catheter-associated
urinary tract infection (CAUTI) if there was documentation of symp-
tomatic urinary tract infections while the patient was with a urinary
catheter or during 48 hours after catheter removal. Finally, pneu-
monia was classiﬁed as ventilator-associated pneumonia (VAP) if
the patient’s chest radiograph showed new or progressive inﬁl-
trates, consolidation, or cavitation in a patient on mechanical
ventilation (or within 48 hours after removal of mechanical ven-
tilation) supported with at least one of the previously described
pneumonia clinical signs or symptoms.17 Pooled mean incidence
density was calculated for pneumonia, BSI, and UTI using patient
days as the denominator, whereas incidence for DAIs was calcu-
lated using the device days as the denominator. The device utilization
ratio (DUR) was calculated as device days divided by the patient
days.6
Electronic data entry and reporting
The data collection process has been previously described.18 In
brief, personal digital assistants (PDAs) were used since the begin-
ning of the surveillance program in April 2011 to facilitate data entry.
The PDAswere programmed using a decision-based tree to help with
classiﬁcations of HAIs based on surveillance deﬁnitions. Hospital
surveillance coordinators were responsible for screening ICU pa-
tients in collaboration with treating physicians for any signs or
symptoms suggestive of infection. They also reviewed laboratory
and radiologic reports. For patients suspected to have an HAI, de-
mographic, clinical, and laboratory data were entered into the PDA.
Depending on the information entered, the PDA would direct the
surveillance oﬃcer to the relevant section. For example, if a patient
had a positive blood culture, then the PDA would direct to a screen
with questions about other sites of infections and the deﬁnitions
for the secondary site of infections. If all answers were no, then the
PDA would classify as primary BSI and would direct to the section
of central line insertion and removal date.
A securedWeb-based surveillance application hosted on the cloud
was developed at the end of 2014 to allow surveillance coordina-
tors to upload the PDA data immediately to the Web. This Web
application included automatic data checks using predeﬁned cri-
teria and allowed hospital IPC teams to generate automated reports
with their data analyzed.
Laboratory procedures
Pathogens causing HAIs were ﬁrst identiﬁed by the hospital mi-
crobiology laboratories. Isolates were inoculated as a pure colony
onto vials containing trypticase soya broth and sent to the NAMRU-3
laboratory on a monthly basis for conﬁrmatory testing, which in-
cluded identiﬁcation and antimicrobial susceptibility testing
according to Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute guidelines.20
Only NAMRU-3 laboratory data are included in this report.
Methicillin-resistant S aureus was deﬁned as any S aureus isolate
resistant to oxacillin or cefoxitin, whereas vancomycin-resistant En-
terococcus was deﬁned as any Enterococcus spp isolate resistant to
vancomycin. For the gram-negative organisms, extended-spectrum
β-lactamase (ESBL) was deﬁned as any Escherichia coli or Klebsiella
spp isolate resistant to ceftazidime or cefotaxime conﬁrmed phe-
notypically using the combined disc with clavulanic acid;
carbapenem resistance was deﬁned as any E coli or Klebsiella spp
isolate resistant to imipenem or ertapenem. Multidrug resistance
was deﬁned as any Acinetobacter spp or Pseudomonas spp isolate
resistant to 1 agent in at least 3 antimicrobial classes by standard
susceptibility testing.21
RESULTS OF PHASE 2 SURVEILLANCE
Infection rates
There were 91 ICUs in 28 hospitals including 989 ICU beds that
participated in phase 2 surveillance. The characteristics of the 28
hospitals that contributed data to this report are shown in Table 1.
There were 2,688 ICU-onset infections reported during the surveil-
lance period. Of these, 30% (n = 812) were primary BSIs (laboratory
conﬁrmed or clinical sepsis), 29% (n = 784) were SSIs, 26% (n = 686)
were pneumonia, and 15% (n = 406) were UTIs. After exclusion of
SSIs, 1,904 ICU-onset infections were reported for 474,544 patient
days, with an overall HAI rate of 4 per 1,000 patient days. Out of
1,904 ICU-onset infections, 1,243 (65.3%) were laboratory conﬁrmed.
The pooled mean rate of ICU-onset pneumonia was 1.4 per 1,000
patient days, ranging from 0.1 per 1,000 patient days in the pedi-
atric surgical ICUs to 5.6 per 1,000 patient days in the trauma ICUs.
The pooledmean rate of primary BSIs was 1.7 per 1,000 patient days,
ranging from zero in pediatric cardiothoracic ICUs to 6.6 per 1,000
patient days in trauma ICUs, whereas the pooled mean rate of UTIs
was 0.9 per 1,000 patient days and reached 3.1 infections per 1,000
patient days in trauma ICUs (Table 2). Incidence for SSIs per surgi-
cal procedure was not calculated because SSIs were only monitored
in ICU patients and not across all patients that underwent surgery.
VAPrepresented76.2%of total ICU-associatedpneumonia,whereas
CLABSI and CAUTI represented 63.4% and 98.3% of BSIs and UTIs, re-
spectively. The incidenceofDAIsvariedby location.VAPhadthehighest
incidence (4.3/1,000 ventilator days) compared with CLABSI (2.6/
1,000 central line days) and CAUTI (1.9/1,000 urinary catheter days).
The trauma ICU had the highest rates of VAP (12.6/1,000 ventilator
days) and CLABSI (9.2/1,000 central line days) as shown in Table 3.
The pooled mean DUR for mechanical ventilation use was 0.3, for
central line use was 0.4, and for urinary catheter use was 0.5.
Organisms causing HAIs
Among 1,904 ICU-onset infections reported (excluding SSIs), 2,073
organisms were identiﬁed. Out of those, 1,235 clinical isolates were
processed at NAMRU-3 laboratories for identiﬁcation and antimi-
crobial susceptibility (Table 4). Relative frequencies of the most
Table 1
Characteristics of hospitals participating in intensive care unit surveillance (April
2012-August 2014)
Hospital type
Bed size category
Total51-200 201-500 >500
Teaching hospitals
Pediatrics 0 4 0 4
Obstetrics 1 2 0 3
Surgical 0 1 1 2
Medical 0 1 1 2
General 3 0 4 7
*Others 2 1 0 3
Public general hospitals 3 3 0 6
Private 0 1 0 1
Total 9 13 6 28
*Bone marrow and emergency hospitals.
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commonly isolated microorganisms in ICU-onset infections are re-
ported in Table 4. Klebsiella spp were the most commonly reported
organisms, accounting for 28.7% of all organisms, followed by
Acinetobacter spp (13.7%). Among the gram-negative pathogens, 42.5%
of Klebsiella spp and 54% of E coliwere ESBL producers, whereas 48.1%
and 13.7% were carbapenem-resistant, respectively. Multidrug-
resistance phenotypes were also identiﬁed in Acinetobacter spp
(92.8%) and in Pseudomonas spp (59.8%). Among the gram-positive
pathogens, 78.9% of S aureus isolates were methicillin-resistant S
aureus, and 35.0% of Enterococcus spp were vancomycin resistant
(Table 4).
DISCUSSION
This report describes the process of developing a national HAI
surveillance program in Egypt. Standardized surveillance method-
ology was used to allow for the determination of HAI rates and for
comparison across hospitals. As of February 2016, the HAI surveil-
lance program covered 61 hospitals (including 2,035 ICU beds) out
of 244 hospitals (including 4,500 ICU beds) in Egypt. The target is
to implement the surveillance program in all hospitals with ICUs
before September 2018.
The surveillance program showed high rates of ICU-onset HAIs,
and a high resistance pattern of organisms causing HAIs, repre-
senting a major risk to patient safety. Trauma ICUs showed the
highest rates of infection for all 3 HAI types (pneumonia, BSIs, and
UTIs). This is comparable with the acute care hospitals in the United
States where the highest infection rates for VAP, CLABSI, and UTIs
were in trauma ICUs6 and comparable with China, where the highest
VAP rates (39.2/1,000 mechanical ventilation days) were de-
scribed in trauma ICUs.22 Trauma ICU patients are at high risk of
infection because of multiple surgical procedures, underlying con-
ditions, need for mechanical ventilation, multiple blood transfusions,
and high device utilization rate compared with other ICUs.23
The pooled DUR ranged from 0.3 for ventilator use to 0.5 for
urinary catheter use and is lower than the DUR reported in other
developing countries, which ranged from 0.5 for ventilator use to
0.7 for both central lines and urinary catheters.24 The data of the
2012 NHSN report showed almost similar DURs, ranging from 0.3
for ventilators to 0.6 for urinary catheters.6
Table 2
Incidence of HAIs by type of location, April 2012-August 2014
Type of location
No. of
ICUs
No. of HAIs
reported
Patient
days
Pooled mean
incidence of HAI
Pneumonia Bloodstream infections Urinary tract infections
n Pooled mean n Pooled mean n Pooled mean
Burn 3 29 6,834 4.2 6 0.9 16 2.3 7 1.0
Medical cardiac 10 71 43,063 1.6 32 0.7 11 0.3 28 0.7
Medical critical care 10 275 62,065 4.4 108 1.7 102 1.6 65 1.0
Medical-surgical 13 279 69,900 4.0 116 1.7 61 0.9 102 1.5
Neurologic 2 46 6,654 6.9 20 3.0 8 1.2 18 2.7
Neurosurgical 8 229 29,382 7.8 109 3.7 45 1.5 75 2.6
NICU 11 468 135,193 3.5 118 0.9 350 2.6 NA NA
Pediatric cardiothoracic 1 32 7,231 4.4 29 4.0 0 0.0 3 0.4
Pediatric medical 9 70 32,738 2.1 28 0.9 38 1.2 4 0.1
Pediatric surgical 3 13 5,220 2.5 0 0.0 10 1.9 3 0.6
Prenatal-surgical 2 46 7,955 5.8 1 0.1 41 5.2 4 0.5
Respiratory 4 65 16,097 4.0 20 1.2 21 1.3 24 1.5
Surgical cardiothoracic 5 17 13,827 1.2 7 0.5 7 0.5 3 0.2
Surgical critical care 7 209 35,190 5.9 74 2.1 81 2.3 54 1.5
Trauma 3 49 3,195 15.3 18 5.6 21 6.6 10 3.1
Total 91 1,904 474,544 4.0 686 1.4 812 1.7 400 0.9
NOTE. Rates calculated as HAIs per 1,000 patient days.
HAI, health care–associated infection; ICU, intensive care unit; NA, not applicable (urinary catheters are not used in NICU patients). NICU, neonatal intensive care unit.
Table 3
Incidence of DAIs by type of location, April 2012-August 2014
ICU type
No. of
ICUs
Patient
days
VAP CLABSI CAUTI
n MV days Rate DUR n CL days Rate DUR n UC days Rate DUR
Burn 3 6,834 3 741 4.0 0.1 13 5,008 2.6 0.7 7 5,531 1.3 0.8
Medical cardiac 10 43,063 22 2,021 10.9 0.0 4 6,052 0.7 0.1 27 10,602 2.5 0.2
Medical critical care 10 62,065 64 17,019 3.8 0.3 76 34,403 2.2 0.6 63 41,130 1.5 0.7
Medical-surgical 13 69,900 104 29,330 3.5 0.4 58 44,888 1.3 0.6 102 56,371 1.8 0.8
Neurologic 2 6,654 0 230 0.0 0.0 5 1,954 2.6 0.3 17 4,980 3.4 0.7
Neurosurgical 8 29,382 76 12,328 6.2 0.4 33 19,576 1.7 0.7 75 27,573 2.7 0.9
Neonatal intensive care 11 135,193 115 25,029 4.6 0.2 198 26,958 7.3 0.2 NA NA NA NA
Pediatric cardiothoracic 1 7,231 15 2,445 6.1 0.3 0 5,759 0.0 0.8 3 1,892 1.6 0.3
Pediatric medical 9 32,738 25 11,533 2.2 0.4 19 12,111 1.6 0.4 4 9,866 0.4 0.3
Pediatric surgical 3 5,220 0 1,032 0.0 0.2 7 1,513 4.6 0.3 3 904 3.3 0.2
Prenatal-surgical 2 7,955 1 793 1.3 0.1 25 2,800 8.9 0.4 4 6,706 0.6 0.8
Respiratory 4 16,097 16 6,145 2.6 0.4 13 6,747 1.9 0.4 23 10,508 2.2 0.7
Surgical cardiothoracic 5 13,827 6 2,078 2.9 0.2 5 9,023 0.6 0.7 3 6,495 0.5 0.5
Surgical critical care 7 35,190 61 10,851 5.6 0.3 39 19,888 2.0 0.6 52 26,663 2.0 0.8
Trauma 3 3,195 15 1,194 12.6 0.4 20 2,185 9.2 0.7 10 3,025 3.3 0.9
Total 91 474,544 523 122,769 4.3 0.3 515 198,865 2.6 0.4 399 213,901 1.9 0.5
NOTE. Rates calculated as DAIs per 1,000 patient days.
CAUTI, catheter-associated urinary tract infection; CL, central line; CLABSI, central line–associated bloodstream infection; DAI, device-associated infection; DUR, device uti-
lization ratio; ICU, intensive care unit; MV, mechanical ventilation; NA, not applicable (urinary catheters are not used in neonatal ICU patients); UC, urinary catheter; VAP,
ventilator-associated pneumonia.
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The VAP rate we observed (4.3/1,000 ventilator days) was lower
than the surveillance data fromGermany (5.4/1,000 ventilator days)25
and comparable with that reported in the United States in 2012
where the pooledmean VAP rate ranged from 0-4.4 per 1,000 device
days.6 The rate of CLABSI in limited-resource countries (Argentina,
Brazil, India, Iran, Mexico, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Peru) ranged
from 1.6-44.6 per 1,000 central line days in adult and pediatric ICUs
and from 2.6-60 per 1,000 central line days in neonatal ICUs. The
CLABSI rates we observed were much lower than what has been
reported from other developing countries andmore comparable with
the 2012 U.S. report of 1.5 per 1,000 central line days (95% conﬁ-
dence interval, 1.3-1.5) in medical-surgical ICUs and 2.9 per 1,000
central line days (95% conﬁdence interval, 2.6-3.1) in neonatal ICUs.6
The reasons for lower CLABSI rates observed in Egypt compared with
other countries may be related to the limited use of central lines
in some of the hospitals, especially in pediatric ICUs. An evalua-
tion done in the past showed that even patients in ICUs are kept
with peripheral intravenous access, which explains our ﬁndings that
approximately 40% of the patients with ICU-onset primary BSI did
not have a central line at the time of infection.
The predominance of gram-negative bacteria (Klebsiella spp,
Acinetobacter spp, and Pseudomonas spp) in the hospital settings is
similar to several surveillance studies in the United States,26 Saudi
Arabia,27 and Brazil.28 The rate of ESBL-producing Klebsiella (42.5%)
was lower than the rates reported from Saudi Arabia (57%),26 similar
to Iran (47%),29 and higher than Lebanon (30%).30 The rate of
multidrug resistance Acinetobacter (92.8%) was comparable with the
rate reported from Pakistan31 and Saudi Arabia.27
There are several limitations to the presented surveillance data.
The reported infection rates could underestimate the true inci-
dence because of diﬃculty in obtaining information from themedical
records regarding clinical signs and symptoms; the lack of uniﬁed
clinical standards for requesting clinical samples (eg, blood or urine
culture), potentially leading to underdiagnosis of infections; and
limited testing of clinical isolates in the hospital laboratories. Ad-
ditionally, not all clinical isolates were sent to the NAMRU-3
laboratories, which might have contributed to decreased levels of
reported resistance.
To institute a national HAI surveillance program, we applied a
stepwise approach for surveillance implementationwith regular eval-
uation that was useful in deﬁning the optimal surveillance
methodology before wide-scale implementation. It also allowed pi-
loting of electronic data collection and reporting procedures, allowed
time for less prepared surveillance hospitals to get training and
improve laboratory capacity, and developed surveillance champi-
ons that advocated for the program at the national level. Several
challenges were identiﬁed since the start of phase 1 surveillance
implementation that had to be overcome.
The ﬁrst was the limited hospital microbiology capacity. One
of the major challenges affecting the surveillance program was the
limited hospital microbiology laboratory capacity in pathogen iden-
tiﬁcation and susceptibility testing. The main problems were
nonavailability of essential supplies, high turnover of staff, and
limited availability of external quality assurance programs. The GDD-
Egypt and NAMRU-3 tried to minimize those issues through regular
trainings for hospital laboratory staff, distribution of standard op-
erating procedures, and provision of laboratory consumables and
reagents. The conﬁrmatory results from the NAMRU-3 laboratory
were shared with hospital laboratories on a regular basis as a way
to evaluate their performance.
The second was communication. In the initial phases of surveil-
lance, the limited or lack of communication between the surveillance
coordinators and the laboratory had a negative impact on case
ﬁnding and reporting. However, regular hospital visits and feed-
back meetings strengthened the concept of teamwork.
The third was human resources and personnel challenges. Lack
of motivation of the surveillance oﬃcers, ICU physicians, and lab-
oratory focal persons were initially hindering the progress of
surveillance. This was caused by the heavy workload, and they con-
sidered the surveillance program as extra to their daily assignments.
Several advocacy workshops were conducted targeting ICU physi-
cians to raise their awareness on the importance of surveillance in
the prevention of HAIs.
The fourth was the quality of the patient medical records.
The limited quality of patient medical records in some hospitals
made it diﬃcult for case ﬁnding or surveillance data validation.
The presence of ICU link nurses, who were in the ICU every day
and were responsible for the HAI surveillance, was critical to the
surveillance program. Continuous awareness among clinicians on
better clinical data and laboratory results documentation was
done.
Therewere several lessons learnedwith this surveillance program.
Phase 1 and phase 2 surveillance data helped to alert policymakers
to the fact that HAIs and antimicrobial resistance represent a true
problem in Egypt, with high burden on the Egyptian health care
system. Strong political commitment was evidenced by a national
launch of the HAI surveillance program in November 2015, which
was attended by the Minister of Health of Egypt. As a result of the
launch, increased awareness on the importance of surveillance and
prevention of hospital infections was obvious.
The future vision for national HAI surveillance is to implement
the standardized approach in all remaining hospitals including ICUs
until September 2018 using the Web-based application.
Despite the challenges, Egypt is moving toward a national HAI
surveillance program, which will generate data to guide andmonitor
prevention strategies and will improve patient safety.
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